Social Capital and Social Justice  by Dinga, Emil
 Procedia Economics and Finance  8 ( 2014 )  246 – 253 
2212-5671 © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ESPERA 2013
doi: 10.1016/S2212-5671(14)00087-2 
ScienceDirect
1st International Conference 'Economic Scientific Research - Theoretical, Empirical and Practical 
Approaches', ESPERA 2013 
Social capital and social justice 
Emil Dingaa*
aCentre for Financial and Monetary Research „Victor Slăvescu”, Calea 13 Septembrie 13, 050711,Bucharest, Romania 
Abstract 
This paperaims toanalyse the issueof implementing the justicein a societywithdemocratic rules,taking into account the social 
capital structure. To thisend, a typology of the social capital isproposedand examined, getting to a qualitativetypologyof the 
social in sixspecieswhichare thengrouped into threepairsbased onthe relationship betweenindividuationand socialization 
phenomena. In thiscontext,social justiceprinciples and criteriaare evaluatedand correlated withthe social capitaltypology, 
extractingconclusions abouthowa practicable social justicemay be boththe source andthe destination othe social capitaldynamics. 
Finally, the paperproposes somenotabledistinctionsbetweensocial justice andsocial rightness, basedalsoon theproposedtypology 
of the social capital. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ESPERA 2013. 
Keywords:social capital, social justice, social rightness, social distribution 
1. Structure of the social capital  
If we imagine our planet (which is limited from any point of view) as a circle, then a model of its sustainability may 
be seen as an equilateral triangle inscribed in that circle (figure 1):  
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Fig. 1.Paradigm of planet Earth sustainability 
 
It is obvious that making any side of the triangle shorter by extending the others is a deviation from 
sustainability. The paradigm of sustainability is an artefact; it has not been invented by nature. Although this 
statement may be strongly polemical, in our opinion, nature invented only the survival, which is not the same thing 
as the sustainability. The difference between survival and sustainability consists in the teleological character of 
sustainability (therefore, about sustainability we may speak only accepting the presence of the cultural beings). 
Actually, the history of the human society is the very history of the domination of one form or another of capital. 
Each category of dominant capital imposed its own logic principle of movement, constructed its own actional 
paradigm and generated its own social formation (table1): 
 
Table 1.General picture of the association of the type of capital with the societal paradigm 
 
 T y p e    o f    c a p i t a l   (F u n d a m e n t a l    o r    c r u c i a l    r e s o u r c e) 













The logic principle Methodological 
collectivism 
Methodological individualism Methodological holism 
The actional paradigm Stationarity Optimality Sustainability 
The societal establishment Naturalism Capitalism ? 
 
Therefore, the necessity (under the sanction of extinction), for the human society, to access the paradigm of sustainability 
by replacing the paradigm of optimality seems to have no other alternative 
 
 
1.2. Want is the social capital? 
 
In general, we will name capital any entity (either substantial or informational) which brings an advantage of any kind 
to the holder of that entity. It is of no importance if that advantage is current or future. According to Figure 1 above, there 
may be six distinct (fundamental) type of capital: a) natural capital (for instance, a river); b) substantial capital (for 
instance, a house); c) financial capital (for instance, amonetaryincome); d) biologic capital (for instance, the health state of 
an individual); e) intellectual capital (for instance, the educational level of a person); f) social capital (for instance, human 
rights institutionalization). These types of capital are correlated causally with the three basic forms of the individual 
welfare (figure 2): 





Fig. 2. Relations of causality between the types of capital and the components of the individual welfare 
 
The social capital originates (primary roots) in the social networks of any kind. These networks can be formal 
(such as the set of formal institutions), or informal (such as the cultural traditions or the moral principles). In order 
to formulate a definition of the social capital we need to identify and systematize the predicates of sufficiency of the 
concept of social capital. We think that these predicates are the following: 
 (PS1): internal pro-cyclicity: the social capital generates a permanent positive feed-back regarding its 
utilization (stating this predicate is equivalent with stating a “law” of the increasing outputs); 
 (PS2): horizontal non-rivalry: the social capital can be used by any contemporary without reducing, by this 
utilization, the amount of social capital available for the other contemporaries; 
 (PS3): vertical non-rivalry: the social capital can be used by any non-contemporary without reducing, by 
this utilization, the amount of social capital available for the other non-contemporaries; 
 (PS4): formal institutionality: the social capital is generated and used only in a formal (encoded)manner. 
Once an existing entity (having thus objective or subjective ontological status) verifies, simultaneously the four 
predicates of sufficiency, that entity becomes a species of social capital. Once an existing entity becomes social 
capital, it generates a new predicate of necessity†: 
 (PN1): axiological assignation: the social capital generates necessarily a list of values which form its 
reason. 
Figure 3 shows the general design by which the predicates of sufficiency and the new predicate of necessity of 
thesocial capital are correlated with the types of capital mentioned earlier: 
 
 PS1 PS2 PS3 PS4 PN1 
Natural capital(CN)      
Physiccapital(CF)      
Biologiccapital(CB)      
Intellectualcapital(CI)      
Moral capital(CM)      
Social capital(CS)      
 
 
†The predicates of sufficiency are, logically, predicates of necessity too, but not any predicate of necessity is a predicate of sufficiency too. 
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1.3. What types of social capital exist? 
 
In order to identify the typology of the social capital we need, of course, a criterion (or a set of criteria) of 
classification. In our opinion, we must use two categories of criteria: 
(a) (IS): criterion of socialisation: by socialization we understand the process of insertion of the individual 
within the society (i.e. establishment of the society through the individual people); 
(b) (SI): criterion of individualization: by individualization we understand the process of autonomizationof the 
individual person in relation with the society (i.e. establishment of the individual person by the society). 
 
Each of the two categories generates a distinct classification of the social capital: 
(a) On the basis of the criterion of socialization (IS)we have: 
 Communication (C): extent and quality to which the people can communicate, live and act with and in 
relation with other people; this type ofsocial capital is „accountable” particularly for the process of 
communitization (establishment of social communities such as: family, team, club, nation, region, social 
networks etc.); 
 Participation (P): extent and quality to which the people have the possibility to take part in the public 
decision-making; is type of social capital is „accountable” particularly for the establishment of the 
political structure of the society; 
 Mutualization (M): extent and quality to which common purposes and common means can be 
established by inter-individual harmonization (either cooperation, or competition); is type of social 
capital is „accountable” for the contractual association of the people (within the nations or states, too). 
(b) On the basis of the criterion of individualization (SI) we have: 
 Liberty (L): extent to which the people can use their own free-will; 
 Trust (I): extent to whicheach individual person is free to delegate own rights or interests toward 
another individual person (towards the state or a supra-state, included); 
 Symmetry (S): extent to whicheach individual person has the same access as any other individual person 
to the societal, public or private, anthropic or natural (education, justice, neighbourhood, opportunity). 
The types of social capital socialization relate to the nature of the process, while the types of social capital 
individualization relate to the nature of the phenomenon. This observation might lead us to an interesting 
conclusion: the individualization of the social capital is the result of the social capital socialization. Therefore, we 
need to accept a form of apriorism of thesocial capital socialization in relation with its individualization. In other 
words, we may consider the individualization of the social capital as a specification (in the Kantian meaning of the 
concept of specification) of its socialization. 
We consider that the proposals of the dedicated literature regarding the typology of the social capital can be 
included in the six classes mentioned above. We will now form three pairs of social capital classes, the first 
component of the pair belonging to the category of socialization, while the second component belonging to the 
category ofindividualization: 
 Communication-liberty (C-L): we will name this pair as the „axiological binomial” of the social capital; 
 Participation-trust (P-I): we will name this pair as thepolitic binomial” of the social capital; 
 Mutualization-symmetry (M-S): we will name this pair as thepraxeological binomial” of the social capital. 
The reason for the formation of these three pairs resides in the relation of causality between the components of 
each pair, so that the arrow of causality originates in the socialization component of the pair and ends in the 
individualization component of the particular pair (figure4).  
 




Fig. 4.Pairingof sufficiency and of necessity predicates of the social capital to the generic types of capital 
 
2. Concept of social justice 
 
2.1. Social justice – mission of the society (state) 
Society – understood as objectivities of the social contract between the state and the citizens – has four 
fundamental missions to accomplish:  
 Ensure the efficient utilization of the resources of any kind, of the human resources mainly(we notice here, 
therefore, the labour force employment); this implies an asymptomatic movement towards the Pareto-
optimal welfare – as it is known, because of the existence of public goods, the Pareto-optimum can be 
achieved (or approximated) only by the state (government); 
 Achieve social justice: the final distribution of the social results of any kind (positiveor negative) on the 
basis of fairness; fairness means: a) achieve the primary distribution according to the merit; b) achieve 
redistribution according to the non-imputable non-merit; 
 Achieve the individual welfare: institutional implementation of a grid of principles which produce and 
reproduce the social capital (of six types, as mentioned earlier); this mission is transversal (synchronic), 
functioning intra-generationally; 
 Achieve the sustainability of the societal dynamics: all societal inputs must be „recovered” 
bysocietaloutputs, sooner or later, in the necessary amount, quality, structure and dynamics; this is a 
longitudinal (diachronic) mission, functioning inter-generationally. 
Therefore, all these four missions of the society are linked, directly or indirectly, either to the capital as such, or 
to the social capital, explicitly. We will now show the causal relation between the second mission of the society 
(achievement of social justice) and the social capital. 
 
2.2. Merit and non-merit in the human society 
 
Merit( ) is anintegrator concept used for the primary distribution of the results of the society’s activity between 
the individual people (primary components of the society). We were saying in the beginning that the merit is 
assigned exclusively to the people, not to the groups or classes of individuals, irrespective of the criterion of 
aggregation. By merit we will understand an intrinsic distributional signaller of a right for the three distinct entities: 
objects (for instance, actual properties), symbols (for instance, currency of financial bonds) and prerogatives (for 
instance, roles). The category of merit is indivisible, although its level or form of manifestation can be different. 
Following are some considerations necessary for the subsequent reasoning. 
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(1) Merit doesn’t exist as such, meaning that it cannot be claimed/assumed or proved/rejected in itself; it exists 
only if and to the extent to which it manifests, objectivities within an action recorded by the social 
environment;by action we understand any exteriorization (perceived by the social environment) of an 
intentionality, irrespective of the form taken by this exteriorization; 
(2) Only the objectivation of the merit associates to itpositive or negative significances for the society at the 
moment when it objectivates (we can notice here a historic character of the merit): if the significance of 
objectivizing the meritby action is positive (appreciated positively by the society), then the merit signals a 
level of compulsory primary distribution from the society (social reward), while if that significance is 
negative, it signals an inverse, compulsory distribution, from the individual towards the society (social 
sanction). 
Non-merit ( )must not be confused with the negative evaluation of merit objectivation. Non-meritis, simply the 
lack of merit.Because, as we have shown previously, merit doesn’t exist by itself, only by its objectivation, non-
merit also doesn’t exist in itself, only by the absence of its objectivation. Non-merit is of two types:  
(1) Imputablenon-merit ( ): is the case when the individual refuses to prove the existence of the merit (this 
proof comes, of course, exclusively by the objectivation of the potential merit through an action with social 
significance); as claimed by Kant, failing to make use of a merit (for instance, a talent) isimmoralthe reason 
why the objectivation of the merit doesn’t occur, is irrelevant; 
(2) Non-imputablenon-merit ( ): is the case when the individual is in a situation of incapacity to objectivates 
his/her merit (for instance, the people with various disabilities); we presume that society has adequate 
criteria and procedures by which it distinguishes non-equivocally between the refusal to objectivate a merit 
and faking this refusal by mimicking the incapacity to objectivates this merit.  
 
2.3. Distributional principles and criteria 
 
The distributional principle is a principle which establishes the distribution of the societal result. In our opinion, 
the distribution of the societal result has two components: a) a distributive component (D1); b) a redistributive 
component (D2). Consequently, we need two distributional principles: a) a primary distributional principle (PD1); b) 
a secondary distributional principle (PD2). The primary distributional principle refers to the direct distribution (the 
distributive component), while the secondary distributional principlerefers to the indirect distribution (the 
redistributive component). Both the direct distribution and the indirect distribution also require distributional 
criteria. 
We consider that the distributional criterion for the direct distribution must be the merit, while the distributional 
criterion for the indirect distribution must be the non-imputable non-merit. We have here two difficult problems 
which we will approach briefly: it is about the two distributions which we may name, a) distribution according to the 
transferred merit; b) distribution according to the presumed merit. Both for the transferred merit, and for the 
presumed merit, we give up the issue of merit objectivation. The transferred merit works as distributional criterion, 
such as merit succession. Merit successions can be legal (stipulated as norms, encoded or informal – such as the real 
inheritances), or can be voluntary (decided by the individual person). Merit successions can be inter-generational 
(for instance, a legacy) or intra-generational (for instance, a donation, gift, sponsorship). Merit successions refer to 
all three categories of merit: regarding objects, regarding symbols and regarding roles. The presumed merit works as 
a merit generation-type distributional criterion. This is the case of assigning positions, roles, etc. to people who 
didn’t yet prove, by objectivation, their merit, but who are expected to objectivate their merit by the distribution 
according to the presumed merit‡.  
Thenon-imputablenon-merit refers to demonstrable impossibilities to objectivate a merit. These impossibilities 
can be of two categories: a) endogenous impossibilities (such as a physic or mental disability); b) exogenous 
impossibilities (such as an obstacle which is out of the control of the particular person – force majeure, for instance). 
Of course, nobody can claim having non-imputable non-merit if a legal norm prevents the action which would have 
 
 
‡For instance, we must include here the concept of efficient wage from the economic theory of the labour market. 
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objectivate the presumptive merit.  
 
2.4. Conditions for the accomplishment of social justice 
 
The accomplishment of social justice implies the accomplishment of the distributional objective. As shown 
above, the distribution of the societal result is done in two steps: 1) direct distribution (primary distribution); 2) 
indirect distribution (secondary distribution, or redistribution). Question is, does the accomplishment of the social 
justice imply the accomplishment of the distributional result (primary distribution according to the merit, or the 
secondary distribution according to the non-imputable non-merit), or does it imply just ensuring the procedural 
conditions for the accomplishment of the distributional result? We consider that the accomplishment of the social 
justice implies just the provision of the means to accomplish the distributional result. This means that the normative 
grid of the society regarding the distribution of the societal result must include all the conditions of sufficiency so 
that the distribution (according to the two forms) is guaranteed according to the mentioned distributional criteria.  
 
3. Correlation between the procedural distribution and the social capital 
 
The objectivation of the procedural distribution, the achievement of the normative (encoded) conditions of 
sufficiency of the primary and secondary distribution according to the associated distributional criteria, will lead to 
the causal, structural and functional correlation between the social capital and the distribution of the societal 
outcome. The following theses can be supported in this matter: 
a. Social justiceis objectivated within the primary (direct) distribution, within the conditions in which the 
distribution of the societal output (NB: not just the economic societal output, but any output generated by the 
society) is done according to the merit. In this case, the type ofsocial capital „served” by primary distribution 
belongs to classIS, i.e.:mutualisation. 
b. Social rightnessis objectivatedwithin the secondary (indirect), within the conditions in which the distribution 
of the societal outputis done according to thenon-imputable non-merit. In this case, the type of social capital 
„served” by primary distribution belongs to class SI i.e.: symmetry. 
c. While the social justicedistributes the due and non-merit-based societal output, social rightness distributes 
the non-due and merit-based societal output.   
d. While social justice relies on the human condition, social rightness relies on the human nature. 
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the four theses mentioned above. 
 
 
Fig. 5.Human nature – human condition in relation connection with the relation social progress-individual welfare 
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